The wave of protests that swept across Tunisia’s north west, centre and southern towns and villages over the past ten days betrays the limits of the political elite consensus between Nidaa Tunis and Ennahda. In a scenario reminiscent of Bouazizi’s self-immolation in December 2010, which sparked the 2011 uprisings across the Arab world, the suicide of jobless electrical engineering graduate Ridha Yahyaoui transformed peaceful sit-ins of unemployed graduates into a wave of protests that threatened to engulf all of Tunisia. The government moved hastily and imposed a nationwide curfew in an attempt to quell the protests. There have been mixed reactions from the government and the political elite. While all recognise that underdevelopment of the said regions is a reality that should be addressed, the government and some political parties seized the opportunity to strike points against their political adversaries. The leftist opposition coalition Popular Front was accused during a popular talk show of being behind the protests, while Ennahda almost explicitly accused the Tahrir Party of fuelling the protests. Beyond the political blame game, the Kasserine protests show that the profound changes set off by the 2011 uprisings are still at work. The protests’ geographic spread could be juxtapositioned on Tunisia’s poverty, underdevelopment and marginalisation map since independence (1984-85 bread protests, 2007-08 phosphate mines protest, 2010-11 Sidi Bouzid 2016 Kasserine protests). The protesting regions voted for Ennahda in the legislative elections and for Moncef Merzouki in the presidential elections in the winter of 2014.

This is a classic of Tunisian affairs; the development and political elite reservoir fault-line between Tunisia’s northeast and coastline towns versus the marginalised periphery on the Algerian and Libyan borders. One would say it is the deep society striking back (again) against the deep state. There is however a novelty this time; Ennahda, whose popular base is anchored the deep society map, is increasingly losing support within disenchanted youth who do not feel represented by Ennahda’s consensus policy. Ennahda will always retain its 20% share in Tunisian society and politics but it is increasingly losing support among youth and other segments of society who five years on disapprove of the social contract that came out of the 2014 National Dialogue. The Popular Front, Tahrir Party, Merzouki’s new Tunisia’s Willingness all see a political opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the disarray of Nidaa Tunis and retreat of Ennahda. One thing is sure: the forces unleashed in 2011 in Sidi Bouzid are profound and run deep across the whole region. No force is likely to ward off the wave of change until the social contract is really re-negotiated.

Links for more information:

After Kasserine, protests break out in 16 governorates

Cartographie de la contestation : le mouvement social continue


http://www.lapresse.tn/25012016/109502/vers-laccalmie.html

Kasserine : Le Front porte plainte contre Safoua Bouazzi

Posted by lakhdarghettas

Dr. Lakhdar Ghettas Author of Algeria and the Cold War: International Relations and the Struggle for Autonomy (London & NY: IB Tauris, 2018)